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We examine international cooperation on technological development as a supplement to, or 
an alternative to, international cooperation on emission reductions. R&D should be increased 
beyond the non-cooperative level if (i) the technology level in one country is positively 
affected by R&D in other countries, (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian 
level, or (iii) the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. A 
second-best technology agreement has higher R&D, higher emissions, or both compared with 
the first-best-outcome. The second-best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no 
international R&D cooperation. Further, when the price of carbon is the same in the second-
best technology agreement and in the case without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, 
R&D is highest and emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement. 
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The Kyoto Protocol is the result of international negotiations over many years. If 
honored, it will reduce emissions in the period 2000-12 compared with ‘Business-as-
Usual’ (BaU) emissions. There are, however, many weaknesses with the agreement. 
The most important is limited coverage: although most countries in the world have 
ratified the agreement, the Kyoto Protocol imposes emission limits on fewer than 40 
countries and this group of countries is responsible for only about a third of global 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). Second, the restrictions imposed by the 
agreement are modest: the difference between the sum of BaU emissions and the sum 
of emissions under the Kyoto Agreement is insignificant: see, for example, Hagem 
and Holtsmark (2001) and Böhringer and Vogt (2003). Third, it is not clear whether 
there will be any follow-up to the Kyoto Agreement after 2012. And even if there is, it 
is not clear whether it will include more countries and/or impose stricter emission 
limits upon the signatories than the present agreement. 
 
Given the weaknesses and uncertainties relating to the ‘Kyoto track’, several 
observers have asked whether other types of agreements might be designed to support 
large reductions of GHG emissions. One idea that has been proposed is to focus not 
directly on emissions but instead on policies affecting emissions. An obvious 
candidate would be a common carbon tax, as discussed by, for example, Cooper 
(1998), Wiener (1999), Victor (2001), Victor and Coben (2005) and Golombek and 
Hoel (2006a). 
 
Another idea would be to focus on technology improvements in order to reduce 
abatement costs, as this might increase a country’s willingness to undertake 
significant emission reductions. For example, it is beneficial to supplement a Kyoto 
type of agreement with technology elements if technological development depends 
not only on a country’s own R&D investment but also on R&D by other countries 
through cross-country technology spillovers. Even with no explicit agreement on 
emissions, an agreement leading to increased R&D, and thus to lower abatement 
costs, might result in a reduction in emissions. This is the background for the 
proposals of a climate agreement on technology development, see, for example, 
Barrett (2003, Section 15.13) and Barrett (2006). So far, there has been one initiative 
focusing on international cooperation on climate-friendly technologies - the Asia 
  1Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) - which aims at 
accelerating the development and deployment of clean energy technologies through 
expanding investment and trade in cleaner energy technologies. To the best of our 
knowledge, the results of APP, where Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South 
Korea and the United States are the partners, remain to be seen.  
 
In the present paper we examine international cooperation on technological 
development as a supplement to, or an alternative to, international cooperation on 
emission reductions. The basic idea of cooperating on technological development is to 
spur innovation and/or diffusion of climate-friendly technologies.  
 
Cooperation on technological development may be designed in several ways. For 
example, it may commit governments to finance or organize basic research on a 
limited number of technologies
1, or to develop technology standards that all countries 
commit to impose domestically. Alternatively, countries may cooperate on policies 
directed toward private agents, for example, by providing instruments (e.g., 
technology subsidies or tax breaks) that foster more R&D or increased application of 
new technologies. Cooperation on technological development may also seek to 
stimulate information sharing between firms by, for example, designing appropriate 
environments for research joint ventures: see Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998).  
 
Below we focus on innovations by private firms that through economic instruments 
are encouraged to undertake R&D. However, we show in the concluding section that 
our results are also valid for cooperation on research financed directly by 
governments. 
 
In section 2 we discuss how improved technology may affect carbon emissions. We 
distinguish between three types of improved technology that may decrease carbon 
emissions: increased energy efficiency, reduced costs of producing non-carbon 
energy, and reduced costs of carbon capture and storage (CCS). Whereas reduced 
costs of CCS will typically reduce carbon emissions, it is reasonable, but not obvious, 
  2that the two other forms of technological improvement will also reduce carbon 
emissions (for a given carbon tax). In the present paper we therefore assume that 
improved technology will reduce carbon emissions for any given carbon tax. 
 
Section 3 presents a model of identical countries where there is a standard negative 
climate externality as well as a positive technology externality: each country’s 
technology level increases not only as its own R&D increases, but also as a 
consequence of increased R&D in other countries. In Section 4 we examine the social 
optimum, which is our reference case. We also discuss how the social optimum can be 
implemented.  
  
Our starting point (sections 5 and 6) is a situation where there is no cooperation on 
technological development: in each country the government sets an R&D subsidy 
non-cooperatively. Further, in each country there is an exogenous carbon tax, equal 
for all countries. The magnitude of the domestic tax rate reflects whether there is 
some cooperation on emissions (see discussion below). For a given R&D subsidy and 
a given carbon tax, profit maximizing firms determine R&D and emissions.  
 
We consider three cases for the exogenous carbon tax. First, the carbon tax is chosen 
non-cooperatively, which implies that the tax will be set equal to a country’s marginal 
climate cost. Second, countries participate in an international quota agreement with 
tradable permits. The domestic carbon tax rate will then be equal to the international 
quota price. Third, countries participate in an international tax agreement, that is, an 
agreement that dictates the domestic carbon tax to be used in all countries. With an 
international quota agreement or tax agreement, the domestic carbon tax will be 
somewhere between the marginal climate cost of a country and the Pigovian level, 
that is, the sum of marginal climate costs of all countries. A domestic carbon tax 
below the Pigovian level reflects that countries, for various reasons, are not able to 
reach a fully optimal agreement. These reasons could include incentives to free ride, 
and also political opposition to high taxes due to distributional consequences.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
1 For an alternative view on government funding of research, see Kealey (1996) who argues that both 
basic and applied research will flourish under a policy of laissez-faire, whereas government funding of 
  3We assume that in each country only a fraction of the total returns to R&D are 
captured by the investing firms. Therefore, even without any international R&D 
cooperation it is optimal for each country to subsidize R&D. In section 7 we show, 
however, that this non-cooperative subsidy is lower than the socially optimal subsidy, 
that is, R&D should be increased beyond the non-cooperative level, if at least one of 
the following three conditions are satisfies: (i) there are positive cross-country 
spillovers (i.e., the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in 
another country), (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian level, (iii) the 
domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. 
 
In section 8 we analyze an international R&D agreement which specifies a common 
R&D subsidy to be implemented in all countries. Because this subsidy is determined 
by the group of all countries so as to maximize total welfare per country, taking into 
account how firms and countries will respond to the agreement in the next stages of 
the game, it is a second-best subsidy. Both the second-best subsidy and the non-
cooperative subsidy depend on the exogenous carbon tax, and they tend to be lower 
the higher is the carbon tax. Yet, the second-best subsidy always exceeds the non-
cooperative subsidy. This is the case even if the tax rate in the R&D agreement equals 
the Pigovian value, whereas the marginal climate cost is used as the tax rate in the 
non-cooperative case. 
 
In section 9 we first compare the second-best outcome with both the first-best 
outcome and the different cases without R&D cooperation. Obviously, social welfare 
is higher under the first-best-outcome than under the second-best technology 
agreement (for a carbon tax below the Pigovian level). Moreover, we show that R&D, 
emissions, or both are higher under the second-best technology agreement than under 
the first-best-outcome.   
 
When the domestic carbon tax is the same in the second-best technology agreement 
and the cases without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, R&D is highest and 
emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement. We also show that under an 
international carbon tax agreement, welfare and R&D are lower, whereas emissions 
                                                                                                                                            
science will lead to skewed research priorities and lost academic freedom.  
  4are higher, than under an international quota agreement, provided that the domestic 
carbon tax is the same in the two cases.  
 
In section 9 we also introduce and compare three agreements: a pure quota agreement 
is an agreement where quotas are set so that the carbon price is equal to the Pigovian 
level, but where there is no cooperation on R&D policies. A pure tax agreement is an 
agreement where the carbon tax is set in the agreement, equal to the Pigovian level, 
but there is no cooperation on R&D policies. Finally, in a pure technology agreement 
the R&D subsidy is chosen to maximize the social welfare of all countries, while the 
domestic carbon tax is at the non-cooperative level.  
 
We show that generally, the pure tax agreement has lower welfare, lower R&D and 
higher emissions than the pure quota agreement. However, it is not generally possible 
to rank the welfare levels of either of these agreements with the welfare level of a 
pure technology agreement. However, we show that R&D and emissions or both are 
higher under a pure technology agreement than under either a pure quota agreement or 
a pure tax agreement. 
 
Finally, in Section 10 we discuss some of our simplifying assumptions and point at 
topics for future research. 
 
 
2. Technological progress   
We assume that each country’s income is increasing – up to a limit – in its own 
emissions. Put differently, each country has an emission level that would follow from 
its optimization problem if the solution of this problem was made without considering 
the environmental impact of the emissions. This is often called the country’s Business 
as Usual (BaU) emission level, and it will typically depend on the technology level of 
the country. Reducing emissions below the BaU level is costly: that is, it reduces the 
country’s income.  
 
We formalize the cost of reducing emissions by the income function  (, ) R ey, where e 
are emissions and y is technology level.  (, ) R ey is the aggregate income function of 
  5each country. The emission level that maximizes  (, ) R ey is the BaU emission level, 
denoted  .  () by (, ) R ey is concave and differentiable, and for  () eb y <  the function 
(, ) R ey is increasing in both its arguments. We also assume that when  , 
technology development reduces marginal abatement costs: that is,   for 
. As will be seen below, this is a critical assumption: 
() eb y <
0 ey R <
() eb y < 0 ey R <  is a necessary 
condition to ensure that a profit maximizing firm will i) reduce its emissions if its 
technology level is increased, and ii) increase its technology level if the carbon price 
is increased. Since   is a critical assumption, we use the rest of this section (and 
the Appndix) to explore under what conditions 
0 ey R <
0 ey R < .  
 
There are three types of technology improvements that may lower carbon emissions: 
 
-  increased energy efficiency 
-  reduced costs of non-carbon energy  
-  reduced costs of carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
 
Increased energy efficiency is sometimes vaguely described as the possibility of 
producing the same output with lower energy input. However, if increased energy 
efficiency can only be achieved by using more of other inputs, e.g., capital, this is 
simply a substitution effect. Increased energy efficiency can be defined as the 
possibility of producing the same output with lower energy input without increasing 
the use of other factors of production. An obvious way of modelling this is to include 
the technology variable   as one of the inputs in the production function, see e.g., 
Popp (2004, 2006). Our assumption 
y
0 ey R <  means that an increase in the input 
“technology level” reduces the marginal productivity of fossil energy ( e R ). In the 
Appendix we use a simple model of the production side of the economy to illustrate 
the effects of increased energy efficiency (and other technological changes). We show 
that   if and only if the price elasticity of carbon energy with respect to its price 
(measured positively) is less than one. Most empirical studies of energy demand find 
price elasticities lower than one, suggesting that 
0 ey R <
0 ey R <  for technology improvements 
that increase energy efficiency.  
  6 
Notice that increased energy efficiency will typically increase the maximal output 
level, that is,  (() ,) R by y. Moreover, if  0 ey R <  for all emission levels, then BaU 
emissions   will decline as y increases.  () by
 
Non-carbon energy, for example, hydropower, nuclear, solar, wind and bio-energy, 
are imperfect substitutes for carbon (fossil) energy. Technology improvements that 
lower the costs of non-carbon energy will typically increase the use of this type of 
energy, and provided the degree of substitutability between carbon and non-carbon 
energy is sufficiently large, the use of carbon energy will decline, implying  . If 
non-carbon energy is used even if there is no policy restriction on emissions, lowering 
its cost is clearly beneficial to the country, so 
0 ey R <
(() ,) R by y will increase as y increases.  
 
Lower costs of non-carbon energy will have a substitution effect, implying that the 
use of carbon energy will decline for a given level of output. However, reduced cost 
of non-carbon energy will typically raise output, tending to increase the use of carbon 
energy. In the Appendix we show that the former effect dominates if the cross 
derivative of the production function with respect to the two energy inputs is negative.  
 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) will always have some costs, and will thus not be 
used if there are no restrictions on emissions. In that case, a lower CCS cost will not 
have any effect on BaU output. On the other hand, if restrictions on emissions are 
sufficiently strict, for example, if there is a sufficiently high carbon tax on emissions, 
then CCS will be used, and reduced cost of CCS will increase its use. In the Appendix 
we show that  0 ey R <  if the marginal costs of CCS are increasing in abatement. We 
believe this is a reasonable assumption, for example, because costs of transporting 
removed carbon to the storage site differ between plants (transport length to the 
storage site differs), or because CCS is less costly at large stationary sources than at 
smaller stationary sources (different technologies).  
 
3. Technology spillovers   
In this section we study how the benefit of R&D investment in one country spills over 
to other countries, thus improving their technology levels. In particular, we derive an 
  7equilibrium relationship between R&D investment and technology level at the country 
level.  
 
We assume that there are n identical countries, and that each country invests in R&D. 
The technology level y of a particular country, henceforth referred to as the home 
country, is assumed to depend on its own R&D investment (x) and the amount of 




While technology spillovers allow a country to benefit from other countries’ R&D 
investment, only a part γ  (with 01 γ < < ) of other countries’ R&D investment is 
beneficial for a country. The technology level of the home country ( y ) is assumed 
given by 
 
   (1) 
* (1 ) yx n x γ =+ − .
 
In (1) we have assumed an additive structure of technology spillovers: that is, the 
technology level of a country depends on the sum of all countries’ R&D investment, 
corrected by the technology diffusion parameter γ . Hence R&D investment, 
corrected by the technology diffusion parameter, is a perfect substitute.
3  
 
The technology level of a particular foreign firm ( ) is determined – seen from the 




   (2) 
** * [(2 ) ] yx xn x γ =+ +− .
                                                
 
 
2 With identical countries, R&D investment will be equal in all countries in equilibrium. However, in 
order to find the equilibrium it is expedient to distinguish between R&D investment in a particular 
country and R&D investment in the other countries. 
3 The modeling assumption of linear spillovers goes back at least to Spence (1984). An alternative 
view is found in Cohen and Levinthal (1989), where it is argued that the ability of an agent to learn 
from others may depend on its own R&D effort. Graevenitz (2002) discusses the policy implications of 
different modeling assumptions, whereas Golombek and Hoel (2004) apply the ideas of Cohen and 
Levinthal on climate policy. Sena (2004) gives an overview of the (empirical) literature on knowledge 
spillovers. 
  8In (2) the first term is R&D investment in the particular foreign country, while the 
terms in the square brackets are the spillover effect from the ‘home’ country plus the 
spillover effects from all other countries.  
 
For the subsequent analysis, it is useful to derive a relationship between R&D 




* () x hy H h y =+ −  (3) 

























It is straightforward to show that 01 H h < <<. Moreover, h is increasing in γ  while 
H is declining in γ . For the limiting case of  0 γ =  we have 1 hH = = . Note that in an 
equilibrium with  , 
* yy = (3) reduces to 
 
  x Hy =  (6) 
4. The social optimum 
In this study welfare of each country is given by its net income  (, ) R ey minus R&D 
expenditures and environmental costs. Below the unit cost of R&D investment is 
normalized to 1. Further, we let the marginal environmental cost for each country, δ , 
be constant and identical across countries. The environmental damage of a country is 
then  ne δ  in a symmetric equilibrium where each country has an emission level e. In 
the first-best social optimum, all firms must have the same emission level ( ) as well 
as identical amounts of R&D investment (
e
x). Hence, in this case, total net benefits 
per country are given by 
 
  (, ) R ey H y n e δ − −  (7) 
  9 
where we have used x Hy = , cf. (6). Maximizing (7) with respect to emissions e and 
the technology level y gives 
 
  (, ) e R ey n δ =  (8) 
and 
  (, ) . y R ey H =  (9) 
 
Equation  (8) is the standard requirement that marginal costs of abatement should 
equal the sum of marginal environmental costs for all countries: that is, the Pigovian 
level.  
 
Rewriting (9) as   gives us a straightforward interpretation of the second 
first-order condition: the marginal benefits of R&D investment when cross-country 
spillovers are taken into account (




− ) should equal marginal costs of R&D 
investment (normalized to 1). We will later show, see the latter part of Proposition 2, 
that the first-best social optimum can be implemented through a suitable carbon tax 
(nδ ) and a suitable technology subsidy.  
 
5. Emissions and R&D in a four-stage game 
We now analyze the market outcome when countries make individual decisions. The 
market outcome follows from a four-stage game, which determines emissions and 
R&D in each country. The four stages can briefly be described as follows
4:   
 
1.  The government in each country sets an R&D subsidy (non-cooperatively or 
imposed through an international agreement) 
2.  R&D in each country is determined by profit-maximizing firms 
3.  The government in each country sets a carbon tax 
4.  Emissions in each country are determined by profit-maximizing firms. 
 
                                                 
4 The assumption that R&D investment is determined before emissions reflects the fact that it takes 
more time to change the technology level (a stock) than emissions (a flow); for an alternative sequence 
of decisions see Golombek and Hoel (2006b). 
  10We start with stage 4. In this stage the technology level y is given from stage 2 and 
the carbon tax t is given from stage 3. Because  (, ) R ey is the income of a 
representative producer, profit-maximizing producers choose emissions in order to 
maximize  (, ) R ey t e − , giving  
 
  (, ) . e R ey t =  (10) 
 
Equation (10) defines emissions as a function of the carbon tax and the technology 
level: 
 
  (, ) . ee t y =  (11) 
  
The assumption that  (, ) R ey is strictly concave implies  0 t e < , while   
implies that  . 
(, ) 0 ey Re y <
0 y e <
 
In stage 3 each government chooses its carbon tax. We assume that this tax rate is 
identical in all countries, denoted t. One possibility is that the tax rate is chosen non-
cooperatively. In this case, each country finds, using (10),  the tax rate that maximizes 
* (, ) ( 1 ) R ey e n e δ ⎡ −+ − ⎣⎤ ⎦  when emissions in all other countries,  , are taken as 
given. This gives the tax rate 
* e
. t δ =  Alternatively,  , tn δ δ < ≤  that is, each country 
internalizes at least some of the cross-country climate externalities. (Full 
internalization corresponds to t being equal to the Pigovian tax rate  . nδ ) There are 
(at least) two interpretations of a domestic tax being higher than the individually 
rational level t δ = . First, countries participate in an international quota agreement 
with tradable permits. The international quota price t, which is used as the domestic 
tax rate, might be less than nδ  reflecting that countries, for various reasons, are not 
able to reach a fully optimal agreement, for example, because of incentives to free 
ride. Second, there is an international agreement dictating the carbon tax to be 
imposed in each country. This tax might be less than nδ , again reflecting that 




Let v denote how a single country valuates emission reductions. If the tax rate is 
chosen non-cooperatively, then  . t ν δ = =  On the other hand, if a country participates 
in an international quota agreement (t δ > ), the cost for the country of a unit of 
emission is the quota price t, so  . vtδ = >  Finally, if a country participates in an 
international agreement that directly specifies the domestic carbon tax (t δ > ), it is 
reasonable that countries in their R&D decisions value reduced emissions only by the 
effect lower emissions have on the country’s own climate costs, that is, . vt δ =<  
 
Table 3 summarizes the discussion above. For all cases we assume that all countries 




Table 1: Domestic carbon taxes and valuation of own emissions 
  Carbon tax  Valuation of own 
emissions 
Non-cooperative decisions   t δ =   t ν δ = =  
Quota agreement  tn δ δ <≤   t ν δ = >  
Carbon tax agreement  tn δ δ <≤   t ν δ = <  
 
 
In stage 2 the producers in each country choose x to maximize their profits, taking the 
R&D subsidy rate, denoted σ , as given from stage 1. If there were no imperfections 
in the markets for innovations, then  (, ) ( 1 ) R ey x t e σ − −−  is maximized, taking R&D 
in other countries (
* x ) as given. Using (1), (10) and (11), we obtain  (, ) 1 y Re y σ =− . 
However, according to Popp (2006) studies suggest that there are imperfections in the 
markets for innovations because the social returns to R&D are about four times higher 
than the private returns. The difference reflects limited intellectual property rights, 
                                                 
5 Another interpretation is that each country has some type of altruism, implying that it (partly) 
internalizes the climate costs of other countries. We leave it to the reader to examine this case, 
  12which means that output from R&D is to a large extent a public good, that is, it can be 
applied repeatedly without decay. Hence, a firm is able to capture only a fraction k of 
the entire social value of its successful R&D investment. Under the assumption of 
, we obtain  1 k <
 
  (, ) 1 y kR e y σ = −  (12) 
 
where k  is assumed to be identical across countries. Together with (10) this gives  
 
  (, ) . yy t σ =  (13) 
 
The assumption that  (, ) R ey is strictly concave implies  , while   
combined with 
0 yσ > (, ) 0 ey Re y <
(, ) R ey being strictly concave imply tha 0 . Whereas we have 
not explicitly included k in the function for y, the concavity o )
t t y >
f
 
  (, R e
. 
.
y implies that y 
is higher the higher is k
 
For the foreign countries we correspondingly have (remembering that the carbon tax 
is assumed to be the same in all countries) 
 
   (14) 
** (, ) yy t σ =
 
We are now ready to proceed to the first stage of the game. We consider this in the 
two next sections, treating first the case of non-cooperatively determined R&D 
subsidies (section 6) and then R&D subsidies determined through an international 
technology agreement (section 7). 
  
6. Non-cooperate determination of R&D subsidies 
Above we introduced three carbon tax policy rules, see Table 1. Because these rules 
are exogenous, the carbon tax in stage 3 is assumed to be independent of the 
technology levels. It then follows from (13) and (14) (and  ) that the technology 
levels are uniquely determined by the subsidy rates. A game of choosing subsidy rates 
is therefore equivalent to a game of choosing technology levels, and below we let 
0 yσ >
  13countries choose their own technology level, taking the technology level of other 
countries ( ) as given. Hence, our (home) country maximizes 
* y
 
  [ ] (, ) ( ) * R ey h y H hy v e − +− −  (15) 
 
w.r.t.  , where we have used (3) and   is a country’s valuation of own emissions, see 
the discussion related to Table 1. Maximization of 
y v
(15) and using (10) gives the first-
order condition for the technology level: 
 
  ( , ) ( )( ( , )). yy R ey h t v e ty = +− −  (16) 
 
Together with (12), i.e., (, ) 1 y kR e y σ = − , we find the optimal subsidy 
 
  1( ) ( ( , ) y kh t v ety σ ) . ⎡ ⎤ =− + − − ⎣ ⎦  (17) 
 
When emissions are evaluated at the same rate as the carbon tax, i.e., v , we have    t =
 
  11 f o r    kh k t. σ ν =− <− = (18) 
 
Note that this expression gives the equilibrium subsidy whenever  t ν = , i.e., for the 
two first cases in Table 1 (non-cooperative decisions or quota agreement). As usual, 
 (firms are not capturing the full return to R&D investment) tends to make the 
subsidy positive, while   tends to make it negative (i.e., a tax on R&D). The latter 
effect represents the incentive for each country to free ride on R&D of other countries 




If we instead have the third case in Table 1 (carbon tax agreement), that is,  t ν δ =< ,  
each country would choose the subsidy  
 
   (19)  1( ) ( ( , ) ) 1 1   y kh t ety k h k f o r t σδ ν ⎡⎤ =− + − − <− <− = < ⎣⎦ . δ
 
  14In this case the equilibrium subsidy is lower the higher is the carbon tax, at least for 
tax rates close to δ .
6 The reason is that each country is now committed to impose a 
carbon tax on its firms that exceeds its own evaluation of increased emissions 
(t ν δ >=). Thus, the tax tends to provide too much abatement relative to what is 
optimal for a county based on its pure self interest. A country will partly adjust for 
this affect through a low technology subsidy to its firms, which tends to reduce the 
technology level of the country. Under our assumption  0 ey R < , marginal cost of 
abatement will now increase (because y has been reduced), and hence emissions will 
be raised. A higher tax is therefore compensated by a lower technology subsidy. As 
seen from  (19), the subsidy is lower i) the more the imposed tax rate exceeds the 
country’s evaluation of increased emissions, i.e., the higher is (t δ − ), ii) the more 
emissions respond to a higher technology level, i.e., the higher is  ( y e − ), iii) the more 
private firms capture of the returns to R&D i.e., the higher is  , and iv)  the higher is 
the rate of diffusion, i.e., the higher is 
k
γ  and thus  .   h
 
The term in the square bracket in (19) is larger than 1 for all  [ ] , tn δ δ ∈  due to  .  
From 
1 h >
(18) and  (19) we thus have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: The non-cooperative R&D subsidy rate is always lower than 1 , and 
may even be negative (i.e., an R&D tax).  If countries value reduced emissions by the 
carbon tax rate (
k −
t ν = ), the non-cooperative subsidy is 1 kh − . If countries instead 
value reduced emissions by its marginal environmental cost δ  and t δ >  (countries 
participate in an international carbon tax agreement), the non-cooperative subsidy is 
lower than 1 .  kh −
 
 
7. The benefits of improved technology 
So far we have studied the four-stage game when the government in each country sets 
an R&D subsidy non-cooperatively. Before examining the case where the R&D 
subsidy is determined in an optimally designed international agreement (Section 8), 
                                                 
6 For sufficiently high values of  , t δ −  σ  will be declining in t only if the term  (, ) y et y −  either 
increases or does not decline too much as t is increased.  
  15we consider the more modest goal of increasing R&D in all countries compared with 
the case without any cooperation on R&D.  
 
A common increase in R&D will give all countries an increase in their technology 
level relative to the non-cooperative outcome. Starting with an arbitrary value of y, the 
benefit for each country of a small increase in y is 
 
  (, ) ( ) ( (, ) ) ( ) ( (, ) ) yy y R ey H n t e ty h H n v e ty δ δ Δ= − + − − = − + − −  (20) 
 
where we have used (16). The benefits of improved technology are thus greater: 
 




-  the greater is the term nv δ − . If v δ =  (carbon tax agreement), this term is 
simply equal to (1 ) n δ − . If vt =  (non-cooperative decisions or quota 
agreement), then nv nt δ δ −= − , which is higher the lower is the carbon tax t  
-  the  more emissions are reduced as a consequence of improved technology 
( ).  y e −
 
According to the second bullet point, under a carbon tax agreement it is beneficial to 
increase the R&D level, and this is the case independent of the magnitude of the 
imposed domestic tax. Moreover, unless vtn δ = =  (full internalization of the climate 
costs of other countries through a quota agreement), there is a benefit of increased 
R&D investment beyond the non-cooperative level - even in the absence of cross-
country technology spillovers - provided this makes emissions decline. The latter 
condition ( ) requires that  0 y e −> (, ) 0 ey Re y < , see the discussion after (11). Finally, 
in the case of full internalization of other countries’ climate costs and no cross-
country technology spillovers (hH = ), the equilibrium coincides with the first-best 





  168. An international technology agreement  
In this section we analyze an international agreement which regulates technology 
policies - we assume that the agreement specifies a common R&D subsidy to be 
implemented in all countries. Because this subsidy is determined by the group of all 
countries so as to maximize total welfare per country, taking into account how firms 
and countries will respond to the agreement in the next stages of the game, it is a 
second-best subsidy. Due to (13) and (14), choosing a common subsidy is equivalent 
to choosing a common technology level (when the choice of the common carbon tax 
rule is assumed independent of the technology level). Below we therefore find the 
technology level   that maximizes total welfare per country, given by  y (7), subject to 
the constraint  , see  (, ) ee t y = (11). The first-order condition of this problem is (using 
(10)): 
 
  () y . y R Hnt eH δ = +−≤  (21) 
 
Using (12), we find that in order to obtain this outcome the second-best subsidy must 
be given by 
   (22)  1( ) ( ( , ) ) 1 y kH n t ety k σδ ⎡ =− − − − >− ⎣ . ⎤ ⎦
 
If the carbon tax is at the Pigovian level tn δ = , the optimal subsidy is 1  Using   . kH −
(8), (9) and (12) , we see that the first-best social outcome is now achieved. Below we 
therefore term 1 kH −  the first-best subsidy. The discussion above leads to the 
following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: In an international technology agreement, the second-best R&D 
subsidy is higher than 1 . If the carbon tax is at the Pigovian level  k − tn δ = , the 
optimal subsidy is 1 , and the first-best social optimum is achieved.   kH −
 
Proposition 2 and (22) imply that the second-best R&D subsidy will be higher than 
the first-best subsidy 1  if t kH − n δ < . On the other hand, the first-best R&D subsidy 
 is higher than the non-cooperative R&D subsidy (because  1 kH − 1 H < ), cf. 
Proposition 1. These results tend to suggest that R&D investment, and hence the 
technology level, is higher under a second-best technology agreement than in the first-
  17best outcome, and also that the technology level is higher in the first-best outcome 
than in the case without any R&D agreement. One should, however, be careful 
because the ranking of technology level does not follow directly from the level of 
marginal benefit of increased R&D; it also depends on how emissions are determined. 
We consider this issue in the next section. 
 
 
9. Comparison of emissions and R&D 
In the previous sections we have considered five outcomes, namely the first-best 
social optimum (Section 4), three cases with an exogenous carbon tax and non-
cooperative determination of R&D (Section 6) and an international technology 




In Figure 1 we have drawn the two curves representing  (, ) e R ey n δ = and 
(, ) , y R ey H =  corresponding to equations (8) and (9). It is easily verified that the 
properties of the function  (, ) R ey imply that these two curves are downward sloping 
in the (e,y) diagram and that  (, ) e R ey n δ =  is steeper than  (, ) . y R ey H =  At the 
intersection point F of these two curves, both equations (8) and (9) hold, so this point 
represents the First-best social optimum.  
 
In Figure 1 we have also drawn two iso-welfare curves. Along each such curve net 
benefits (per country) – given by (7) – are constant, and net benefits are higher the 
closer the curve is to the maximum point F. From the conditions  (8) and (9) of the 
first-best social optimum, it follows that the iso-welfare curves are horizontal at the 
intersections with  (, ) , e R ey n δ =  and vertical at the intersections with  (, ) . y R ey H =   
e R nδ = e R t =
y R H =







N • T •
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We have also drawn curves for  (, ) e R ey t n δ = <  and  (, ) y R ey h =  in Figure 1. Since 
nt δ > , the curve  (, ) e R ey t =  must lie to the right of the curve  (, ) . e R ey n δ =  
Similarly, since H h < , the curve  (, ) y R ey h =  must lie below the curve  (, ) . y R ey H =  
 
Because relation (10) is valid both with and without cooperation on R&D, these 
equilibria are located somewhere on the line  (, ) e R ey t = . Notice that the exact 
position of this curve depends on t, and will lie further to the left the higher is t. 
Without any cooperation on R&D, the equilibrium condition for R&D is given by 
(16). If emission reductions are valued by the domestic carbon tax ( t ν = ), then 
(, ) y R ey h = , so the equilibrium must be at the point M in Figure 1. Note that if  , t δ =  
M represents the case of non-cooperative decision of the tax rate as well as the R&D 
subsidy. If  , tn δ δ <≤  M represents the case of an international quota agreement. 
Next, if emission reductions are valued by the marginal cost of emission (ν δ = ) and 
t δ > , we must have  (, ) y R ey h >  at the equilibrium, implying point N in Figure 1. 
Hence,  N represents the case of an international tax agreement. Notice that N 
coincides with M for the limiting case of t δ = . Comparing M or N with F we have 
the following: 
 
Proposition 3: Emissions are higher and R&D lower in the case of no cooperation on 
R&D than in the first-best social optimum. 
 
With a technology agreement R&D is determined by (21), implying that 
(, ) y R ey H < . The equilibrium, which in Figure 1 is represented by the point P, is 
therefore on the line   (, ) e R ey t =  somewhere above the curve  (, ) y R ey H = . In Figure 
1, emissions and the technology level are higher at P than at F (first-best outcome). 
However, this ranking depends on the way we have drawn the curves in Figure 1. In 
general, several rankings are possible. For example, the technology level may be 
lower and emissions higher in P than in   However, from Figure 1 we see that if 
emissions are lower in P than in F, then the technology level is higher in P than in F. 
To sum up:   
. F
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Proposition 4: The ranking of R&D investment and emissions between the second-
best technology agreement and the first-best outcome is ambiguous. However, either 
R&D or emissions or both must be higher in the second-best technology agreement 
than in the first-best outcome. 
 
We can also use Figure 1 to compare M/N (no R&D cooperation) with P (an R&D 
agreement) when the domestic carbon tax t is the same in these equilibria, that is, 
when the equilibria are located on the same line  (, ) e R ey t = . We immediately get the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 5: For any given domestic carbon price t, an R&D agreement gives 
higher welfare, higher R&D and lower emissions than the case of R&D policies being 
determined non-cooperatively. Moreover, with non-cooperative R&D policies the 
carbon tax agreement (implying v δ = ) has lower welfare, lower R&D and higher 
emissions than a quota agreement (implying vt = ) when t is the same in the two 
cases. 
 
The case of no agreement whatsoever is given by the point M in Figure 1 for  . t δ =  
Starting from this point and introducing an international quota agreement with a 
carbon price equal to the Pigovian level (tn δ = ), but without introducing R&D 
cooperation, will move the equilibrium to Q in Figure 1, which we term a pure quota 
agreement. From Figure 1 it is clear that the move from M to Q increases welfare, 
increases R&D and reduces emissions. If we instead, starting from point M in Figure 
1 for  , t δ =  had introduced R&D cooperation without any cooperation on emissions, 
henceforth termed a pure R&D agreement, we would move from M to P (for t δ = ), 
which increases welfare, increases R&D and reduces emissions.  
 
In Figure 1, P has higher R&D and higher emissions than Q. While this seems 
plausible, it does not hold as a general result. We now show that P may have higher 
R&D or higher emissions than the equilibrium Q, and that the welfare ranking can go 
either way. We start with the welfare ranking. 
 
  20In the limiting case of (almost) no technology spillovers, that is,  0 γ ≈  and thus 
 the two lines  1 hH ≈≈ y R H =  and  y R h =  will (almost) coincide. Hence, Q will 
(almost) coincide with F, implying that welfare is higher under Q than under P. On 
the other hand, for the limiting case of (almost) no concern for the environment, that 
is,  0 n δ δ ≈≈ , P will (almost) coincide with F, implying that welfare is higher under 
P than under Q. These two cases have an obvious interpretation: If there are two 
externalities, the welfare gain of correcting only one of them is largest when one 
corrects the most important one. In the limiting cases above, one of the externalities 
was negligible. 
 
Consider again the limiting case of (almost) no technology spillovers ( 0 γ ≈ ), that is, 
when Q (almost) coincides with F. Assume moreover that  0 ey R ≈  for emissions along 








=≈  and using (21), P will (almost) be on the curve 
y R H = . If   for emissions to the left of the curve  0 ey R < e R δ = , then the curve 
y R H =  will be downward sloping to the left of the curve  e R δ = (as in Figure 1). In 
this case P must lie southeast of F, and therefore also southeast of Q since Q (almost) 
coincides with F. This is thus an example of a pure R&D agreement giving lower 
R&D and higher emissions than a pure quota agreement. Next, consider the limiting 
case of (almost) no concern for the environment ( 0 n δ δ ≈ ≈ ), that is, P (almost) 
coincides with F. In this case P will be located to the northwest of Q. This is thus an 
example of a pure R&D agreement giving higher R&D and lower emissions than a 
pure quota agreement. 
 
Finally, starting from the point M in Figure 1 for t δ =  and introducing an 
international tax agreement where tn δ = , henceforth termed a pure tax agreement, 
will move the equilibrium to T in Figure 1. T will have a lower welfare level than F. 
For the case  0 γ ≈  and   along the curve  0 ey R ≈ e R nδ = (implying  ), T will 
(almost) coincide with F and welfare will therefore be higher under T than under P. If 
0 y e ≈
0 n δ δ ≈≈ , P will (almost) coincide with F, implying that welfare is higher under P 
than under T. 
 
  21The results above are summarized in the following Proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: The ranking of social welfare, R&D investment and emissions between 
the pure technology agreement and the pure quota agreement or the pure tax 
agreement is ambiguous. However, either R&D or emissions or both must be higher 
in the pure technology agreement than in the pure quota/tax agreement. 
 
 
10. Concluding remarks 
The aim of the present paper has been to improve our understanding of the incentives 
to invest in climate-friendly R&D and to abate under different institutional 
arrangements. We seek to identify the main forces at work when improved technology 
lowers costs of abatement. Our modelling strategy is to study these forces within a 
simple framework as possible. Below we discuss some of our simplifying 
assumptions, arguing that whereas the exact formulas derived in the present paper 
clearly depend on these assumptions, the main results of the present paper can be 
generalized.  
 
First, throughout the paper we have assumed that R&D was undertaken by private 
firms and could be influenced by the government through an R&D subsidy. However, 
our conclusions would be similar if we interpret R&D as being directly financed by 
the government. As noted in section 5, a game of choosing R&D subsidy rates is 
equivalent to a game of choosing technology levels. Moreover, with cooperation over 
R&D the equilibrium condition x Hy =  implies that choosing y (via a common 
subsidy rate) or choosing x directly gives exactly the same outcome. The second-best 
technology agreement is thus the same if R&D is set directly by governments or 
indirectly through the choice of a common R&D subsidy. 
 
We now argue that also for the case of no R&D cooperation, our results are not 
qualitatively changed if R&D is not determined indirectly through a subsidy, but 
directly by the government: Above our (home) country chose technology level y (via a 
subsidy rate) in order to maximize  [ ] (, ) ( ) * , R ey h y H hy v e −+− − taking   as given. 
This problem has 
* y
(16) as its first-order condition. Assume now that R&D is not 
  22determined indirectly through a subsidy, but directly by the government. Inserting (1) 
and  (3) into (15), we find that the net benefit of a country is given by 
* (, ( 1 ) ) R ex n x x v e γ +− − − . Maximizing this expression w.r.t. x, taking 
* x  as given, 
yields  (, ) 1 ( ) ( (, ) ) , yy R ey t v e ty =+ − −  which is almost identical to (16), the only 
difference being that h is replaced by 1. However, our main results are unaffected: 
Propositions 1 and 2 (about subsidy rates) are no longer relevant, while it is 
straightforward to see that Propositions 3-6 remain valid also for the case in which 
RD investments are set directly by the governments. 
 
Second, countries have been assumed to be identical. Countries may differ along a 
number of dimensions, for example, with respect to climate costs, size (which may be 
related to climate costs), technology diffusion and income. At least for some of these 
factors, for example, the technology diffusion parameter, it is easy to derive formulas 
that are not based on identical countries. However, our main results would not change.  
 
Third, we have assumed that all countries participate in the technology agreement. We 
suspect that our main results would not change of there in addition to the cooperating 
countries was a group of countries that did not have any, or only marginal, R&D 
investments (typically, a group of developing countries). One could thus interpret our 
cooperating countries as some relatively small group of large countries, for example, 
China, the EU, Japan and USA, which stand for a major part of global R&D expenses. 
 
Yet, a topic for future research may be to endogenise the number of participating 
countries in an international environmental agreement (IEA). One approach is to 
endogenise the number of signatories through applying the ‘standard’ IEA model in 
which countries decide in the first stage of the game whether they will participate in 
the IEA, whereas in the second stage the group of signatory countries chooses 
abatement in order to maximize welfare of the IEA member countries, see, for 
example, Barrett (1994) and Finus (2001). Within this framework the equilibrium 
number of signatories is typically small. In addition, if costs or benefits change so that 
the potential net benefit of cooperation increases, the number of signatories shrinks. 
Both of these unwarranted properties may call for a new approach of modelling IEAs.   
 
  23Several factors may be of importance in explaining how an IEA should be designed in 
order to attract broad participation. For example, burden sharing and lobbying are 
factors that may play a role in determining the number of participating countries. In 
fact, these factors may favour technology agreements over emission based 
agreements, that is, quota or tax agreements: under an emission agreement, some 
sectors will bear a disproportionately high share of total abatement costs. Workers and 
owners in such sectors will often be successful in lobbying against stringent 
abatement measures, thus making it difficult to reach an international agreement that 
substantially reduces emissions.  
 
In contrast, the costs of technology development will typically be more evenly shared 
by everyone in the economy as they will be borne by the taxpayer to finance public 
R&D or to give tax breaks/subsidies to private firms investing in R&D. Some sectors 
of the economy producing ‘knowledge’ will even gain from such technology 
development, and might thus engage in lobbying for a technology agreement. These 
arguments suggest that it might be easier to obtain broad participation in a technology 
agreement than in an emission agreement.  
 
Finally, we have also a simplifying assumption related to verifiability. Under a 
technology agreement, the common technology subsidy internalizes that improved 
technology in one country is beneficial also for other countries. The common 
technology subsidy in a technology agreement is therefore higher than the technology 
subsidy each country would have offered to its domestic firms in the case without an 
international climate agreement. Because each country prefers – based on pure self-
interest – a lower subsidy than the one dictated by the agreement, each country has an 
incentive to set various non-verifiable domestic policy instruments so that the country 
achieves its individually rational level of the technology subsidy. This may be 
possible, at least to some extent, because technology policies are often an integral part 
of a country’s tax system, making it really hard, if possible at all, for an international 
agency to verify all aspects of other countries’ R&D policies.  
 
In contrast, carbon emissions are easy to calculate, for example, based on fossil fuel 
use: using various sources of statistics, an international agency can determine whether 
a country has honoured an emission agreement or not. Thus, the limited verifiability 
  24of a technology subsidy suggests, cet. par., that a technology agreement is less 
efficient than an emission based agreement. 
 
There is also another problem of verifiability when R&D investments are subsidized, 
or more generally, when R&D firms receive government support. R&D is a vague 
concept, and it is therefore hardly feasible to define R&D in such a way that an 
agency (regulator) can clearly distinguish between R&D activities and non-R&D 
activities. Therefore, when firms face an R&D subsidy (or some other instruments 
that spur their R&D activity) they have an incentive to categorize more activities as 
R&D, thereby receiving a higher amount of subsidies than intentionally. Note, 
however, that under an international emission based agreement where the R&D policy 
of a country is determined at the national level, it will typically be optimal to offer 
some type of support to the domestic R&D firms because the social returns to R&D 
may by far exceed the private returns ( 1 k <  in our model). Therefore, the verifiability 
problem at the firm level is present both under R&D based and emission based 
agreements.  
 
Obviously, the non-verifiability problem of a technology agreement weakens the case 
for placing too much emphasis on international technology cooperation. But it does 
not suggest that it is optimal to fully disregard international R&D cooperation. 
Overall, our results and discussion suggest that some steps towards including 
technology elements in an international climate agreement – even in an imperfect 
manner – may be a valuable supplement to emission based agreements. Thus, a topic 
for future research is to explore design of international climate agreements that are 
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  27Appendix 
Below we study under what conditions  (, ) 0 ey Re y < , distinguishing between three 
types of technology progress; increased energy efficiency, lower costs of non-carbon 
energy and lower costs of carbon capture and storage (CCS). We let each type of 
technology improvement be represented through a technology variable, which is 
treated as an input.  
 
Let E be effective energy: 
 
(, ( , ) ) , E E Ey FG φ =  
 
that is, a composite good produced by fossil (F)  and  non-fossil (G) energy. In 
addition, the amount of effective energy is increasing in the technology variable   
( ), reflecting increased energy efficiency. The energy input E is used together 
with a vector of other inputs v – typically different types of materials - to produce 
gross output  .  Let Q be net output in the economy: 
E y
1 0 E >
(, ) vE Φ
 




Net output Q is obtained by subtracting the costs of using fossil energy  , the cost 
of using non-fossil energy  , the cost of CCS 
F pF
() G qy G (, C CF ey − , and the costs of 
other inputs   from gross output  v pv (, ) vE Φ . The cost of non-fossil fuels is lower the 
higher is the technology variable  ( G y 0 G q < ), and the cost of CCS is lower the higher 
is the technology variable   ( C y 2 0 C < ). Emissions are denoted e, and these are 
measured in the same unit as fossil energy F. Hence, Fe −  is abatement.  
 
Next, we define the income function  
 
,, (, , , ) m a x { (, ) ( ) ( , ) } GCE F G v F G C v R ey y y vE pF qy G CF ey pv =Φ − − − − −  
 
  28With reasonable assumptions on the underlying functions above,  ( ,,,) EGC R ey y y  will 
be strictly concave and increasing in its arguments. To check whether it is reasonable 
that marginal productivity of fossil energy,  ( ,,,) eE G C R ey y y , is declining in the three 
technology variables, we shall consider three simplified versions of the model. 
 
Increased energy efficiency 
First, we focus on energy efficiency, that is, we ignore non-fossil energy and CCS. 
Let  , and assume that the net income function is given by  E yy =
 
(, ) ( ()) F R ey ye pe α =Ω −  
 
where   and  . Increased energy efficiency is thus modelled as fossil 
energy augmenting technology improvement through 
0 ′ Ω> 0 ′′ Ω<
() y α , which is assumed 
increasing in  . It is straightforward to derive that  y 0 ey R <  if and only if 
() 0 ye α ′′ Ω+ Ω< ′ . This inequality holds if and only if the price elasticity of e with 
respect to   (measured positively) is less than 1, that is, if  F p
() 1
()





, where the elasticity is defined at the point where  0. e R =
7 
The magnitude of this price elasticity is an empirical question, yet we find it 
reasonable that it is below one: most empirical studies of energy demand find price 
elasticities lower than one.  
 
Reduced costs of non-carbon energy 
Second, we focus on reduced costs of non-carbon (non-fossil) fuels, that is, we ignore 
increased energy efficiency and CCS. Let  G yy = , and assume that the net income 
function is now given by  
 
{ } (, ) m a x (, ) () GF R ey eG pe qyG =Θ − −  
 
                                                 
7 This result also holds if gross output is given by  ( )
1 () . ye
ββ α
− Φ  
  29  30
Θ ()
(, ) () G eG qy
where   is increasing in its arguments and strictly concave, and qy is declining in 
y. For an interior solution for G, we have Θ =
(, ) e y
, which implicitly defines 
the function GG =  where G . It is straightforward to derive that  0 y >
ey eG y R G =Θ 0 eG , which is negative if and only if Θ <
(, (, ) ) 0 ee F Re G e y p =Θ − = (, ) F py
. Further, the relation 
 implicitly defines ee =  where e  because of 
concavity. We also have   if and only if 
0
F p <
0 e G < 0 eG Θ < 0 ey R . Hence,  <   if and only if 
demand for non-carbon energy Ge  is increasing in the price of carbon 
energy  ; a higher price of carbon energy will reduce emissions (e  ), which 
will increase non-carbon energy G if and only if 
(( , ) , ) F p y y
F p 0
F p <
0 eG Θ <
0 ey R
, which is a sufficient 
condition for  < . We think the condition  0 eG Θ <
C yy
 is reasonable because typically 
carbon and non-carbon energy are substitutes. 
 
 
Reduced costs of carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
Finally, we focus on reduced costs of CCS, that is, we ignore improved energy 
efficiency and lower costs of non-carbon energy. Let  = , and assume that the net 
income function is given by 
 
{ } (, ) m a x ( ) () ( ) FF R ey F pF y F e βχ =Ψ − − −  
 
where  ,  0 ′ Ψ> 0 ′′ Ψ< ,  0 χ′ > ,  0 χ′′ > () y  and the variable β  is assumed to be 
declining in y. The optimal amount of fossil energy is given by 
() ()( ) , F F yF e p β χ ′′ Ψ= − + (, FF =
0. y F >
 which implicitly defines the function   
where   From the envelope theorem we have 
) e y
() ( ) ((,) ) eF R yF e F e yp β χ′′ =− = Ψ − . Thus  () ey y R FF ′′ = Ψ
ey R
, which is negative   
under our assumptions. Hence 0 ,  <  under the reasonable assumptions of a 
concave production function and marginal costs of CCS being increasing in abatement 
( 0 χ′′ > ).  
Figure 1  
 
 
e R nδ = e R t =
y R H =
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